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A component of agricultural policy in Chile is the use of price bands
to stabilize domestic price movements in selected agricultural crops
and processed agricultural commodities. In the 1990s, the use of price
bands for wheat, fats and oils, and sugar resulted in the equivalent of
roughly a 22 percent tariff on these commodities. Depending on the
result of pending discussions with the WTO following a complaint by
Argentina and of ongoing discussions regarding Chile’s participation in
the North American Free Trade Agreement, constraints could be im-
posed on Chile’s use of price bands to protect its agricultural economy.
The prospect of agricultural trade policy reform in Chile raises a
number of related policy concerns. One of these is rural-urban income
divergence, which remains at high levels. Rural wages are roughly one-
third of the average wage in Chile’s large cities (1996 Casen Survey).
Carter (1997) notes the implications for political stability. Another
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consequence of income divergence is rural-urban migration (Harris
and Todaro, 1970). Urban populations grew faster than rural popula-
tions throughout the 1990s. A closely related issue that became in-
creasingly prominent in the recent economic slowdown is the emergence
of high levels of urban unemployment.
A question of considerable interest, then, involves the effect that
these developments might have on the economic analysis of the out-
come of trade liberalization. Several recent applied general equilibrium
studies undertake the quantitative modeling of the likely effect of Chil-
ean trade liberalization (Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr, 1997; Benjamin
and Pogany, 1998). The existing literature, however, uses aggregated
models of a strongly neoclassical flavor. As the preceding discussion in-
dicates, the Chilean economy exhibits certain features closely associ-
ated with the development literature—namely, rural-urban migration,
urban unemployment, and imperfect labor mobility. Since these eco-
nomic features can have important consequences for the analysis of the
effect of a number of different policies including trade reform, it seems
appropriate to consider Chilean agricultural reform in the context of a
model that incorporates them. That is task addressed in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we briefly discuss the
policy background. Section 2 uses a formal general equilibrium model
to illustrate some important agricultural trade policy consequences of
urban unemployment and imperfect labor mobility. This formal model
also highlights the underlying structure of a large (fifty-sector) numeri-
cal general equilibrium model, which we describe in section 3. In sec-
tion 4, we present the results of simulations designed to quantify the
effects of removing the price bands in Chile under the assumption of
dual labor markets with imperfect labor mobility, and we discuss policy
implications. Accounting for the second-best implications of urban un-
employment and limited labor mobility is shown to affect outcomes of
agricultural reform. A key result is that removing price bands results
in modest net welfare gains, but the welfare gains turn negative with a
more comprehensive removal of all agricultural and food tariffs. This is
a consequence of predicted increases in urban unemployment and de-
clines in rural wages. Section 5 contains our concluding comments.
1. POLICY BACKGROUND
Overall economic growth in Chile has been very uneven, and the
division between rural and urban economies remains significant. ManyImperfect Labor Mobility, Urban Unemployment 377
analysts note Chile’s inability to integrate the poor rural regions with
the rapidly growing industrial economy. Other researchers focus on
the phenomenon of rural-urban migration in response to rural-urban
income differentials. These differentials persist in the face of high
rates of unemployment in Chile’s major urban centers.
There is considerable debate over the importance of different fac-
tors as determinants of migration responses. The general economic
framework postulates that migrants make rational economic choices,
in which they consider the real income adjusted for the probability of
obtaining employment at the destination and the costs of migration.
Costs may include transportation, job search (expenses and opportu-
nity cost), lodgings, and the like. They may include so-called upskilling
costs, such as education and training necessary to obtain urban em-
ployment. They may also include less immediately obvious, but none-
theless real, opportunity costs such as giving up locational preferences
and attachments to existing arrangements. These costs may be offset
by chain effects—the availability of information through networks of
previous migrants.
While labor migration may lead to a more efficient allocation of
resources in a first-best framework, in a second-best framework, mi-
gration may worsen problems of urban congestion and unemploy-
ment, significant levels of which developed in urban Chile in the early
2000s. In Santiago, the rate of unemployment in 2001 was more than
10 percent.
Chile thus displays a number of important economic developments:
high rates of urban unemployment; continuing flows of migrants from
rural to urban areas in search of better income opportunities; and the
attendant mix of urban congestion and poverty. Into this heady mix of
domestic economic issues comes Chile’s bid to join the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, which will clearly entail further reform of
its external (trade) policy. The remainder of the paper explores the
consequences of agricultural trade reform in Chile given the domestic
problems of urban unemployment and rural-urban migration.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To reinforce the structure of the numerical model we describe in
section 3, we present a formal derivation of some key results con-
cerning agricultural liberalization in a model with rural-urban mi-
gration, and we demonstrate how these may be altered by imperfect378 D. Holland, E. Figueroa, R. Álvarez, and J. Gilbert
labor mobility. Consider a developing economy with distinct rural
and urban regions. An industrial good, X, is produced in the urban
region and exported. An agricultural good, Y, is produced in the rural
region. Full employment of labor prevails in the rural region, but a
rigid wage in the urban region creates unemployment. Following
Harris and Todaro (1970), migration occurs between the two regions
until the expected urban wage is equal to the actual rural wage. Capi-
tal is fully mobile. To keep things simple, world prices and factor
endowments are exogenous. A compact algebraic description of the
model is
Equations (1) and (2) are zero profit conditions (we chose px as
numéraire), which can be solved for the factor prices. Once these are
known, Shepherd’s lemma enables us to derive the optimal input-
output coefficients (aij). Equation (3), the Harris-Todaro labor market
equilibrium condition, can be solved for the equilibrium rate of em-
ployment, π . Equations (4) and (5) are the factor market constraints,
which can then be solved for output levels. Finally, equation (6) is the
budget constraint expressed in terms of the gross national product
(GNP) and expenditure functions, which can be solved for the welfare
level. All the usual assumptions apply; production functions are ho-
mogeneous of degree one, continuous, and strictly concave; and the
utility function is continuous, quasi-concave, and increasing in con-
sumption of both goods. To guarantee stability, we assume that X is
capital intensive (the Neary condition). Now, totally differentiating
the budget constraint yields
() = ,1 , X cw r (1)
(2) () = ,, YY cw r p
(3) =π , ww
(5)
(4) +π =π , XL YL aX aY L
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where dW ≡ Eudu, and an asterisk designates a world price. Follow-
ing Corden and Findlay (1975), we define the total urban labor force
as LU, and then dLX = π dLU + LUdπ . Substituting into equation (7) we
have
where we have simplified by making use of the fact that dLU + dLY = 0.
The incremental change in welfare is thus the sum of a Harberger
effect and the effect of changes in the probability of employment. As is
well known, free trade is suboptimal, since dW ≠ 0 when =
*
YY pp  (only
the first term drops out).
Let t be a tariff imposed on Y, such that  () +=
* 1. YY pt p Using
this and dividing both sides of equation (8) by dt, we have
which is the basic decomposition of the welfare effect of an agricul-
tural import tariff. The first term reflects the deadweight loss, and it
is negative. However,                                   , and a sufficiently small tariff
will thus raise social welfare if it raises the probability of employment.
By construction, factor prices are determined entirely by goods
prices, and so logarithmically differentiating equations (1) and (2) and
solving yields
where a circumflex denotes a proportional change, θji is the cost share
of factor j in industry i, and
It is clear from equation (1) that the return to capital is fixed. Now
from equation (3), we know that                 , and hence the probability
of finding urban employment improves with a small tariff on Y. Re-
versing the arguments indicates that liberalizing agricultural trade
may lower welfare.
() =− + π
* , YY Y U dW p p dM wL d (8)
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The preceding analysis has cast the neoclassical Harris-Todaro model
of the developing economy in a slightly different light, since the model is
generally used to illustrate the negative welfare consequences of restrict-
ing imports of capital-intensive goods. Less frequently emphasized is the
positive welfare effect of agricultural export subsidies, and the clearly
implied (second-best) role for agricultural protection.
Three recent papers attempt to incorporate imperfect labor mo-
bility into the Harris-Todaro framework (Parai and Beladi, 1997; Gil-
bert and Mikic, 1998; Gilbert and Wahl, 2001). The latter two introduce
the concept of the elasticity of labor migration. Consider a situation
in which there is a differential between the rural wage and the ex-
pected urban wage, ρ ; hence equation (3) becomes             . The
variable ρ  is positive and may represent locational preferences, at-
tachments to existing arrangements, a high cost of relocation, and
the effect of a restrictive government policy, as discussed in section
1. The elasticity of labor migration can then be defined in a natural
way as
which is the proportional change in the total urban population in-
duced per proportional change in the expected wage differential
(0 < ε < ∞ ). All other equations remain unchanged, as does the funda-
mental welfare derivation for a tariff on Y, given equation (9). The
proportional change in the probability of employment, however, is
now
which is of ambiguous sign, in general.
A full analytical description of the properties of this model, while
interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
which in the case of a tariff on Y (discussed above) can be shown to
have negative welfare effects. Hence, the less labor movement is
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allowed, the greater is the potential for gains from agricultural liberal-
ization. Moreover,
such that this model converges to the standard Harris-Todaro case. There
is clearly also a critical value of ε (such that         ) beyond which the
model will behave in the same manner (qualitatively) as the standard
Harris-Todaro model.
The intuition behind the result is quite straightforward. An
agricultural tariff in the standard Harris-Todaro model draws labor
and capital out of the urban region, but because agriculture is labor
intensive, more labor is drawn than capital. The end result is an
improvement in urban employment. In the limiting case of no labor
migration, the rural wage rises as before and agricultural output ex-
pands, but now labor cannot move to fill the needs of agriculture. A
reduction in production of X then leads to higher urban unemploy-
ment, and welfare subsequently declines. Hence, the degree of labor
mobility, in addition to the prevalence of urban unemployment, be-
come important variables when evaluating the consequences of agri-
cultural trade liberalization in a developing economy.
3. AN APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
The simplified framework described above, while helpful in for-
malizing the issues involved, makes a number of major abstractions
in the interest of tractability. The most obvious include the dimen-
sions of the model and the effect of other policy distortions on the
equilibrium system, which can have important second-best implica-
tions. While it is difficult if not impossible to take all of these factors
into account within the constraints of an abstract formal model, an
applied general equilibrium (AGE, also known as computable general
equilibrium, or CGE) model is well suited to the task. Such models
take data from an actual economy or set of economies and combine
them with a structural description of the behavior of agents within
the system and the constraints that they face. The system can then
be solved numerically, and the effect of policy interventions can be
quantitatively examined within a consistent framework that accounts
for important market interrelationships.
ε→∞

π=  π 
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In this section we describe an applied counterpart to the formal
model analyzed above. Our notation uses the Greek alphabet to denote
free and calibrated parameters, lower case letters to denote policy vari-
ables, and bars to denote those variables fixed by the closure assump-
tions. The sets used are as follows: g represents agents; sectors are
defined as i(j) ⊂ g; urban sectors are u ⊂ i; endowment commodities
are f, and underemployed endowments are m ⊂ f. Full definitions are
presented in the appendix. The basic structure is the well-established
single-country Armington trade model.1
The production block consists of a set of constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production functions, with intermediates used in
fixed proportions:
Equation (13) represents the corresponding demand functions for
primary factors. A subset of factors have prices fixed exogenously in
a subset of sectors, corresponding to the rigid urban wages of the
Harris-Todaro specification:2
where PFmu =           and PFfi = PFf, with f ∉ m. This implies unem-
ployment of that subset of factors, with the rate of employment de-
fined by equation (14)
PFmu
1. We present only brief details of the Armington trade model. For a full
description, see, for example, Devarajan and Lewis (1990).
2. There is no government-imposed wage floor in Chile, so our characteriza-
tion of unemployment as arising from downward inflexible wages is a simplifica-
tion. Other explanations (such as search costs) are plausible. Furthermore, labor
classified as unemployed in this model does not contribute to net social welfare,
whereas in reality these workers are likely to be involved in the informal sector
(although their marginal productivity may well be very low). For both of these
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Equation (15) specifies our modified Harris-Todaro factor market
equilibrium conditions:
where i ∉ u. Equation (16) introduces an inelastic migration response,
as in our simplified model above:3
Finally, equation (17) defines the factor market constraints:
The demand block consists of two levels. At the first level, house-
holds maximize a Stone-Geary linear expenditure system (LES), the
objective function of which is equation (19), subject to their income
as defined in equation (18). At the second level, the household opti-
mizes domestic and imported goods (see equation 24).
where g represents the government or investors as appropriate, and
where g represents households. Equation (20) defines the correspond-
ing household demand functions:
where g represents households.
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3. The Harris-Todaro specification of labor market equilibrium is often inter-
preted as implying a competitive auction in each period, with each worker having
an equal chance of obtaining employment. As in all models, this is a stylized
description—we interpret equation (16) only as meaning that once the dust has
settled, any new equilibrium will have the familiar Harris-Todaro characteristics.384 D. Holland, E. Figueroa, R. Álvarez, and J. Gilbert
Firms demand final goods in fixed proportions to their output:
Final demands for government consumption and investment are
fixed in quantity terms by equations (22) and (23):
where g represents the government, and
where g represents investors.
Having allocated their expenditure across the commodities, all
agents then choose the optimal combination of imports and domestic
production (the Armington composite). This is reflected in each agent’s
demands for domestic production (equation 24) and imports (equation
25).4 The introduction of product differentiation via this mechanism
is the major departure of the model from models of standard trade
theory.
Equations (26) through (30) describe the price equations of the model,
and they have straightforward interpretations. Equation (28) defines
the price of a composite of imports and domestic production; it is de-
rived from the assumption of CES Armington aggregation. Similarly,
we use constant elasticity of demand (CED) functions to describe how
world prices respond to changes in the trade volume (equation 30). Equa-
tion (29) defines net prices. The nominal exchange rate is the chosen
numéraire for the system (all prices in the model are relative prices).
, ig i CG = (22)
, ig i CI = (23)
(21) . ij ij j j Ca Q =∑
4. Allowing each agent to independently make import decisions along
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Lastly, we impose equilibrium conditions on the model. Equation
(31) defines the familiar material balance conditions, and equation (32)
the balance of trade. The current account balance is set exogenously.
Since Walras Law implies the equilibrium conditions are not indepen-
dent, any one of them can be dropped.
To summarize, the AGE model presented here incorporates the
key features of our formal modeling: institutionally rigid urban wages
and corresponding urban unemployment, rural-urban migration in
response to expected wage differentials, and an imperfectly elastic
migration response. It also makes a number of extensions. It can
accommodate many endowment factors, each of which may be fully
or partially employed, fully or partially mobile, or specific to a given
economic activity. It can accommodate many sectors, each of which
can be classified as rural or urban and traded or nontraded. The
model incorporates product differentiation, thereby accommodating
simultaneous export and import activities in the same sector and vary-
ing domestic versus import preferences among agents. Finally, the model
incorporates a complete set of trade taxes and subsidies to ensure ac-
counting for the second-best implications of policy interventions.
The GTAP4 database (McDougall, Elbehri, and Truong, 1998) is
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in the model, as well as for many of the free parameters.5 The base
year of the data is 1995. Although virtually all of the now-extensive
applied general equilibrium literature based on the GTAP4 database
employs the GTAP model described in Hertel (1997), or derivatives
thereof, it is a straightforward procedure to extract the information
necessary to construct a single-economy model such as that used here.
Also, because we are using a single-country model, we are able to
work at a much greater level of detail than most of the GTAP-based
literature (we use fifty sectors, of which four are nontraded and forty-
six are traded—the full GTAP4 disaggregation). Using the GTAP4
data ensures not only that our starting point is consistent with much
of the existing research, but also that the data are widely available to
other researchers who wish replicate our results.
We supplement the GTAP4 data with rural and urban labor force
counts from the 1996 National Socioeconomic Survey (Casen) data-
base, which we use to estimate rural and urban wages consistent
with the GTAP4 payments data. Agricultural and resource-based in-
dustries (forestry, fishing, and mining), along with processing activi-
ties that are generally located close to a raw material source (food
production, lumber production, and so forth) are assumed to be rural
activities, while textiles, heavy manufactures, and services are clas-
sified as urban. In this model the urban region represents the cities
of Santiago, Concepción, and Valparaíso. The rest of Chile is repre-
sented as rural. The initial (baseline) urban unemployment rate of
7.35 percent is from the Casen survey. The implied expected urban-
rural wage differential in 1995 is nearly 200 percent (that is, the ru-
ral wage is just over one-third of the expected urban wage)—which
reflects the substantial impediments to labor mobility that remain a
feature of the Chilean economy. Since estimates of the elasticity of
labor migration are not available, we use two limiting values: low
(0.1) and high (10). The model is implemented in the General Alge-
braic Modeling System (GAMS) and solved in levels form. The follow-
ing section presents the results of our policy simulations.
4. RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of the simulations are presented in tables 1 through 4.
Table 1 summarizes the recent history of commodity price bands in
5. The calculation of model parameters is specified in GAMS code for the Chile
model. The code and the model are available from the authors on request.Imperfect Labor Mobility, Urban Unemployment 387
Chile in terms of tariff equivalents. Table 2 presents some important
economywide summary statistics for the estimated effects of removing
the agricultural price bands followed by estimated effects of removing
all tariffs on agricultural and food commodities. The first column gives
the estimated change in welfare, measured as the equivalent variation
in millions of 1995 dollars. The second column is the estimated rate of
urban employment (one minus the rate of urban employment gives the
rate of urban unemployment). Finally, the third column gives the ru-
ral labor wage as a percentage of the urban labor wage. Table 3 pre-
sents estimated percent changes in baseline agricultural production,
while table 4 presents the estimated percent changes in baseline agri-
cultural imports. Changes in trade and quantity supplied occur in all
other sectors, as well; we do not report those results in this paper, but
they are available from the authors.
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Consider first the effect of removing the price bands on wheat, fats
and oils, and sugar. When labor movement is relatively inelastic, wel-
fare is estimated to rise by just over $6.28 million. When a high level of
labor mobility is assumed, the gains drop by over $3 million but are
still positive. This result confirms the importance of the migration
elasticity parameter. As our simple abstract model indicated would be
the case, when labor is relatively immobile, the removal of price bands
improves the urban unemployment problem. When labor is more mo-
bile, however, price band removal leads to expanded migration to ur-
ban areas and thus to expanded urban unemployment relative to the
low-mobility scenario. This has a detrimental effect on the net welfare
gains from liberalization.
When labor is relatively immobile, price band removal improves
urban unemployment because more capital than labor shifts to the
Percent change in volume
Initial output value Low mobility High mobility
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urban economy, and the increased capital allows more urban labor to be
employed at the fixed wage. In the case of high mobility, the urban em-
ployment rate still goes up, and the rural wage goes up relative to the
base line. This is because more of the rural labor force has moved to the
urban labor force, allowing the rural wage to be bid up for the remaining
labor. The welfare gain is lower in the case of high mobility, however,
because of the increase in urban unemployment.
The estimated effect of the reform scenarios on Chile’s pattern of
food and agricultural production, as well as imports, is presented in
tables 3 and 4.6 Two main patterns emerge. First, removal of the price
Percent change in volume
Initial output value Low mobility High mobility


















































































































6. The GTAP4 data (1995) on vegetable oils no longer represent the current
situation in Chile. The data indicate a small domestic oil industry with small im-
ports, but the domestic crushing industry has since disappeared, as has production
of edible oil seeds, which have been replaced by imports of edible oil.390 D. Holland, E. Figueroa, R. Álvarez, and J. Gilbert
bands leads to substantial expansion of imports of the directly affected
commodities, as we might expect. Second, the next-most-substantial
changes in import volumes (which are negative) are for commodities that
are inputs into the production of the directly affected commodities, such as
sugar beets in the case of sugar. For example, the removal of the price
band on sugar leads to an increase in sugar imports of 69 percent (table 4.)
and a fall in sugar production of nearly 5 percent (table 3).7 With reduced
sugar production, the inputs into domestic sugar production—such as
sugar beets—are likewise reduced (table 3).
In the case of a full removal of agricultural tariffs, the policy leads
to a loss in welfare that increases as the elasticity of labor migration
increases. The reduction in agricultural supply is more pronounced
the more labor mobility is allowed (table 2). With high labor mobility,
the urban employment rate falls relative to the baseline. The rural
wage declines as capital and labor are drawn out of rural areas, re-
flecting the relative reduction in capital in the rural region resulting
from increased international competition. The result is a falling em-
ployment rate in the urban area, increased unemployment in the
urban area, and reduced wages in the rural area. While total returns
to capital do increase, the harm inflicted on rural workers and the
worsening of urban unemployment offset the efficiency gains from
cheaper imports and result in a net welfare loss. In the case of low
mobility, the loss in welfare stems mainly from the reduction in the
rural wage relative to the urban wage. In this scenario, the urban
employment rate manages to increase relative to the baseline, but
urban unemployment increases and the overall change in welfare is
negative.
The results of the model thus generate some valuable policy les-
sons. The most important point is that in a general equilibrium model
that accounts for imperfect labor mobility and urban unemployment,
the removal of the price bands on wheat, sugar, and fats and oils in-
creases welfare, but the net effects of total agricultural tariff elimina-
tion are estimated to be negative. The elimination of all agricultural
7. The production functions used in the model assume quasi-concavity and
continuity. The assumption of continuity becomes somewhat tenuous in a sector
like sugar, which is characterized by only a few processing plants that require a
minimum output level to remain viable. In this case, reduction of production
below a given threshold would result in the collapse of the industry. From this
point of view, our prediction of a 5 percent reduction in sugar production may be
conservative and dependent on a continuity assumption that may not be true.
Some observers of Chilean agriculture feel that the sugar industry would collapse
completely without the protection of the price band.Imperfect Labor Mobility, Urban Unemployment 391
and food tariffs generates sufficient urban unemployment so as to ne-
gate the positive welfare effect stemming from lower agricultural and
food prices. Chile’s labor policy needs to be closely coordinated with
possible trade liberalization. If reform results in significant harm to
the agricultural sectors increases in urban unemployment will miti-
gate the beneficial economic efficiency effects.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
As in all economic models, the applied general equilibrium tech-
niques used in this paper are based on a highly stylized structural
framework, and this raises a number of issues. One problem with the
approach used here is that it is difficult to separate rural and urban
activities cleanly along sectoral lines. Another is that the single-country
specification means we are unable to account for the effect of Chile
gaining access to other markets or the effect of Chile’s liberalization
on other economies. With regard to the latter issue, several recent
studies develop global general equilibrium models, so there is little
need to add to that literature. Most of the gaps that remain to be
filled involve Chile-specific issues, and more detailed single-country
models are an appropriate analytical tool. With respect to the former,
to paraphrase Whalley (1985), applied general equilibrium models
increase the level of understanding of how institutions affect out-
comes, tell a story that is consistent with a set of stylized facts, and
provide a consistent framework for the policy debate. The results
presented in this paper should be interpreted in this context.
Our findings also suggest that given the existence of urban un-
employment and its second-best implications, policies harmful to ag-
riculture and other rural-based industries should be approached with
caution if they are likely to provoke worsening terms of trade for the
rural sectors. The gains from lower natural resource prices are likely
to be offset by worsening rural-urban income divergence and urban
unemployment.
Finally, the analysis in this paper examines only the removal of
agricultural and food product tariffs. More comprehensive trade lib-
eralization would also remove existing export and output barriers,
taxes, and subsidies—not only on agriculture, but also on other por-
tions of the economy. It is quite possible that the net effect of com-
plete liberalization would result in economywide adjustments that
would substantially improve overall welfare, but that is another study.392 D. Holland, E. Figueroa, R. Álvarez, and J. Gilbert
APPENDIX
Notation Used in the Model
This appendix provides the full definition of all the variables and
parameters used in the model presented in section 3 (equations (12)
through 32). An asterisk at the end of the definition indicates param-
eters that are independent of the base year data (free) and are sup-




PWXi World price of exportables





ERf Employment rate (             )
UNf Unemployment (             )
COSTf Cost of migration (             )
U Utility level
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The following parameters do not appear in the model, but they
are used in the calibration process of the Stone-Geary utility function
(to determine the subsistence parameters). The Frisch parameter
(minus the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income) scales the
price elasticities.
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